Roberto Burguet joined UCF after spending most of his academic life in Barcelona. He also has been a visiting professor at the University of Illinois, University of Arizona, University College Dublin, INSEAD and Colegio de Mexico, as well as Stony Brook University, his alma mater, where he graduated in 1988. His research interests include a wide range of topics in industrial organization and microeconomic theory.
- Coalitional Bargaining with Consistent Counterfactuals (with R. Caminal), Journal of Economic Theory, 187 (2020)
- Personalized Pricing and Uncertainty in Monopsony (with J. Sákovics), International Journal of Industrial Organization, 67 (2019)
- Bidding for Talent in Sports (with J. Sákovics), Economic Inquiry, 57(1), (2019), pp. 85– 102
- The Microeconomics of Corruption (with J.G. Montalvo y J.J. Ganuza) Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial Organization, Vol. II, Edit. L. C. Corchón and M. A. Marini, 2018, Edward Elgar Pub.
- Bertrand and the Long Run (with J. Sákovics), International Journal of Industrial Organization, 51, (2017), pp. 39–55.
- Procurement Design with Corruption, American Economic Journal; Microeconomics, 9(2), (2017) pp. 315–41.
- Competitive Foreclosure (with J. Sákovics), RAND Journal of Economics, 48(4), (2017) pp. 906–926 7.
- Procurement Lobbying (with J. Sákovics)
- Cartels and Bribes (with E. Iossa and G. Spagnolo)
- Targeted Advertising and Costly Consumer Search (with V. Petrikaite)
- Measuring Child Mortality Impact of Official Aid for Fighting Infectious Diseases, 2000- 2010 (with M. Soto)